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On April 7, 2009, IBM celebrated the mainframe’s 45th year.  Drawing on its 
roots in punch-card tabulators, the machine has come a long way to become many 
customers’ preferred e-business solution.  Throughout its lifetime, IBM’s strategy 
adapted the machine to the changing market.  During the late 1960s, the introduction of 
the  System/360 provided customers with compatibility and scalability across various 
computer lines.  Popularity of the system began to suffer during the client/server era of 
the 1990s but it quickly recovered as the z Series server line was developed to support e-
business solutions. IBM’s strategy made the mainframe successful but continued 
improvements are still necessary to ensure its future success.  
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IBM MAINFRAME: A STUDY IN BUSINESS STRATEGY  
Chapter 1:  Introduction  
The IBM mainframe celebrated its 45th year on April 7, 2009.   Drawing its roots 
in punch-card tabulators, the machine has come a long way to become many customers’ 
preferred e-business solution.  Designed to consolidate a wide range of early computer 
applications and to promote backward compatibility, this machine was a big success 
when first introduced in 1964.  Throughout the years, the machine has been successfully 
adapted and reinvented in response to trends, innovations and declines in the market.  
Although IBM’s strategy made the mainframe successful today, continued improvements 
to the mainframe’s visibility in the market are still needed to ensure its future success.  
 - 2 - 
Chapter 2:  Mainframe’s Roots 
The roots of the mainframe stem from IBM’s punch-card tabulators.  Thomas 
Watson Senior, through careful spending and business savvy, built the company to be a 
leader in this market.  Punch-card solutions were the trend within industries and 
generated a lot of profit for IBM.  Over time, however, companies became inundated 
with punch-cards and began looking for alternate means to store and tabulate 
information.  It was reported that Metropolitan Life Insurance “had three floors of its 
building devoted to storing the cards” (39).   When IBM learned that Time-Life, a long-
time customer, was considering making a transition into alternate means of storage, the 
company started to take serious action (Young 38 -39). 
Watson’s son, Thomas Watson Jr., began investigating alternate means of storage 
to understand the new market trends.  He queried IBM’s “top salesmen to look into the 
future of magnetic tape” (39).  He learned that this new innovation in technology was 
reportedly “able to store thousands of records on a single tape spool” (39).  Customers 
who were looking to reduce their storage space were already eagerly anticipating a 
machine capable of supporting this new technology.   As a result, Watson decided to 
advance IBM’s products into the computer age to meet the new growing demand in the 
market (Young 39). 
The company began making a massive investment in the field of computers.  
Unlike his father, Watson Jr. was willing to spend enormous amounts of money 
necessary to make his effort successful.  Although some wondered why IBM “was 
chasing the electronics grail when punch card tabulators were selling better than ever. 
Watson Jr. pushed on” (41).  He recognized that this endeavor was a means for IBM to 
stay technically competitive in a changing punch-card market.  By 1955, his massive 
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investments increased the company’s debt to $255 million and “revenues more than 
tripled, from $215 million to $734 million” (43).  Watson’s strategy took the company 
into the computer age by investing in a promising new field.  Computers ultimately 
eliminated the entire basis of IBM’s original business of punch-cards.  As the market 
shifted away from punch-card tabulators, however, IBM was now able to provide 
customers with computer alternatives (Young 42-43). 
 IBM leveraged its reputation to transition customers from punch-card tabulators 
to the company’s computerized solutions.  Even though customers acknowledged that 
their company’s future relied on computers, they were uneasy about making the change 
alone.  Clients wanted a “business-oriented sales and support personnel to help them out” 
(43).   They needed someone to facilitate this transition.  IBM was known for providing 
this type of superior service in the punch-card industry.  By retaining the sales force and 
the same business model that made the punch-card tabulator market successful, IBM was 
able to use its reputation in the emerging computer market.  Customers were more 
comfortable upgrading their current solutions knowing they had IBM’s support personnel 
at their disposal (Young 37 -43). 
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Chapter 3:  Road to Mainframe 
From the mid to late 1950s, IBM achieved industry leadership in computing.  The 
company made advances in computer technology while working on large government 
contracts.  IBM provided computing solutions that spanned a wide range of  scientific 
and commercial applications.   Although the company successfully delivered unique 
solutions to its customer, it was spreading itself thin (Yost 53- 54). 
Supporting the various computer lines became difficult as IBM’s computer 
market grew.  There were high production costs associated with manufacturing the 
different computer systems.  Sustaining the various programming capabilities for the 
different computer types became very taxing. The company’s effectiveness in the market 
was reduced because it was competing over a broad range of computers.  The sales and 
service personnel needed training to provide support for each of the different systems 
(Pough 267).  In his book, Yost remarks that, “even the talented and knowledgeable IBM 
sales force was not capable of effectively marketing all of these different computing 
systems” (59).  IBM’s various computer lines became very disorganized and needed 
restructuring (Yost 59). 
IBM’s customers also found flaws in the various computer lines.  Since the 
different computer lines were not compatible with each other, it became difficult for 
customers to upgrade their systems.  “Customers could not shift between [different 
computer lines] without incurring major switching costs”  (Yost 59).   In many cases, 
customers had to rewrite their current system’s software in order to be able to upgrade to 
a newer system.  Upgrading their systems became disruptive and costly.  Customers 
started to seek solutions that were better designed to handle their business needs and 
compatibility (Pough 267-268).    
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Due to the rapidly growing need for compatibility, IBM initiated the SPREAD 
Task Group in 1961.  The group’s mission was to examine IBM’s current line of 
computers and determine the products’ future.  What the group concluded was that in 
order to maintain its “competitive advantage over other firms,” (59) all of IBM’s current 
computer products needed to change.  The group’s report suggested making a new family 
of computers that provided backwards compatibility with subsequent system upgrades.  
This compatible family of computers would address the issues introduced by the current 
line of incompatible computers.  By undertaking this strategy, IBM positioned itself to 
address the customer’s and the company’s needs (Yost 59). 
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Chapter 4:  System/360 
On April 7, 1964, IBM’s latest line of computers was revealed to the world with 
the introduction of  the System/360.  Named 360 for each degree on a compass, the first 
line of mainframe computers was marketed to encompass a wide range of jobs and 
applications (Pough 275).  The machine promoted compatibility which allowed 
customers to easily migrate to bigger and better lines of computers, as required by their 
businesses.  Application development became easier to migrate since the new machine’s 
architecture allowed for backwards compatibility.  For IBM, focusing on one computer 
line allowed for a reduction in training costs of new personnel.  The effectiveness of the 
sales staff was also greatly improvement.  The System/360 was so successful that within 
a few years it captured 75% of the market while IBM’s major competitors had less than 
5% each (Yost 59 - 61).   
System/360 was succeeded by the System/370.  For the next two decades, IBM 
continued making improvements to the mainframe in order to maintain a competitive 
edge over its competition in the market, and to attract customers.  “Early System/370 
models were five times faster and 70 percent cheaper” (50) than some of the early 
System/360 models.  Through subsequent innovations, models became as much as 26 
times faster.  Customers were able to benefit from these advancements in technology 
while seamlessly upgrading their systems as required by their businesses.  Through these 
non disruptive means and backwards compatibility, IBM was able to advance customer’s 
business solutions forward.  Technological advancements also allowed IBM’s business 
solution to keep up with advancements in the market’s technology (Boyer 50-51).  
Although everything seemed to go well in the market, experts were predicting “that the 
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late 1970s and the early 1980s would mark the end of the mainframe-based solutions” 
(Ziegler 2). 
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Chapter 5:  Mainframe’s Downfall 
When System/390 was introduced for the customer of the 90s, the mainframe 
became less desirable.   “For some industry pundits it didn’t look like the mainframe was 
going to survive the early 1990s” (51).  In 1991, InfoWorld’s Stewart Alsop, predicted 
that the mainframe would be unplugged within five years (Boyer 51).  A gap began to 
form as personal computers (PCs) started providing customers with a cheaper alternative 
to the mainframe.  For many, the personal computer alternative was a cheaper solution 
for their business needs.  PCs were equipped with the ability to perform a lot of the 
computational functions that the mainframe was providing at lower costs.  Customers 
could link their personal computers together at an office and create a distributed network 
solution that emulated the mainframe’s centralized functions.  A chasm in business 
solutions technology began to emerge as a new generation of workforce entered the scene 
and began adopting the PC based solution (Imhoff et al.).   
As a new workforce generation began emerging on the market, it was not familiar 
with the mainframe.  As Don Whitehead, Sun’s director of mainframe migration, points 
out in a 2008 article, “they don’t teach people how to run mainframe in college.  Most of 
the mainframe programmers I know are looking at their retirement plans” (Kanellos). 
Even though the machine still continued to be the backbone solution of many big 
businesses, the machine’s popularity began to suffer.  A lot of the knowledge that was 
necessary to support these machines was limited to people who were already familiar 
with it (Kanellos).   
The lack of information in the mainstream market lent itself to various 
misconceptions about the mainframe.   Many businesses started to believe that the total 
cost of ownership of a mainframe was too high.  Compared to the cheaper PC alternative, 
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this seemed true.  A company could buy a number of inexpensive personal computes, use 
the client/server deployment method to connect them together as servers and create a 
personal distributed network.  Doing so, customers could simulate a mainframe’s 
functions at a fraction of the cost.  Businesses could also maintain all their data locally 
and expand their networks as needed by adding more personal computers.  Customers 
unfamiliar with the mainframe believed this to be a cheaper and simpler solution (Imhoff 
et al). 
 However, customers did not realize that the costs for distributed network 
environments increased linearly as the workload requirements increased.  When new 
servers were attached to support new workload requirements, more people were needed 
to support it.  Concurrently, as new servers were added to the networks, they needed to be 
synchronized with the servers already connected to the network.  This meant that a 
“redundant copy of the operating system, database management system, and application 
software, data and utilities” (Imhoff et al. 27) was required.   There were costs associated 
with each copy and data needed to be synchronized over a number of servers.  This 
synchronization increased chances for discrepancies in data integrity and created security 
risks.  The mainframe was ideal to solve a number of these issues, but IBM was not yet 
successfully leveraging open standards and the client/server model that was emerging in 
the market (Imhoff et al.). 
 Software compatibility also became a concern for some businesses.  As personal 
computers entered the mainstream, a new generation of programmers began developing 
software solutions and applications on familiar platforms (Carico).  Although IBM 
successfully developed and trained their mainframe professionals, many were beginning 
to near their retirement age.  As Burt points out, “the bulk of students coming out of 
college have cut their teeth on new computing models” (Burt 34).  As new and 
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sophisticated software became available, customers believed that they were not available 
on the mainframe system (Imhoff et al.).  The gap in expertise was an issue IBM needed 
to address quickly.  The mainframe’s operating system needed to be adapted for a new 
generation of software developers. 
By the end of 1994, IBM was beginning to suffer.   “The company had racked up 
$15 billion in cumulative losses over the previous three years, and its market cap had 
plummeted from a high of $105 billion to $32 billion” (Hamel 138).  Many started to 
believe in the conventional wisdom that distributed networks were the way of the future.  
The company’s inability to reinvent itself in response to the changing world posed a 
potentially fatal obstacle.  Fortunately, the emergence of the Internet and implementation 
of open standards revived the mainframe’s marketability (Boyer 51).   
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Chapter 7:  Mainframe’s Recovery 
While watching the 1994 Winter Olympics, David Grossman, a typical 
programmer, was one of the first IBMers to notice the Internet’s potential to help the 
company.  IBM was the official technology sponsor of the Olympics in Norway.  The 
company provided all the data for the days’ events.  IBM created a centralized network at 
the Olympic village that could be accessed from various terminals.  “IBM installed two 
mainframes, one to handle net operations and control data flow, and another to handle 
general data storage” (Cooney 11).  Although all the data was maintained on a central 
IBM mainframe machine, the information was also provided publicly on the Olympics’ 
website.  What was misleading, however, was that the website was run by Sun 
Microsystems.  The Internet was still fairly new at the time but it appeared as though Sun 
was actually the company providing the Olympics’ data.  Grossman realized that IBM did 
not even recognize this.  There was a huge opportunity in the Internet and Grossman 
wanted to make sure IBM didn’t miss this opportunity (Hamel 138).   
Grossman began working with John Patrick to transform IBM’s internal culture.  
At the time, everyone at the company was still using mainframe terminals for 
communication.  Grossman and Patrick wanted everyone to switch to using the Internet.  
They encouraged employees to leverage the Web in order to effectively communicate 
with customers and to do electronic business (e-business).  Although many seasoned 
IBMers felt skeptical about this new endeavor, IBM eventually began supporting their 
efforts.  Lou Gerstner, IBM’s CEO at the time, supported their ideas.  His “early belief in 
the importance of network computing, dovetailed nicely with the logic of the Internet” 
(143).  Patrick took their efforts even further by publishing a manifesto outlining how 
IBM could leverage the Web for it business (Hamel 138 - 143). 
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The nine page document described ways in which IBM should use the Web.  The 
overall message was to bring customers and investors closer to IBM and its products.  
The manifesto stated that each employee should have an email address.  Doing so would 
make employees, including top executives, more available to customers.  The document 
also suggested making the company’s homepage a critical tool in IBM’s marketing and 
communication with customers.  Through his manifesto, Patrick wanted IBM to leverage 
the Web for electronic commerce (e-commerce) and electronic business (e-business) 
(Hamel 140). 
In subsequent years, IBM took steps towards e-business.   As Gerstner remarked 
in a 1998 InformationWeek article, “the company is taking steps to help customers adapt 
to the strategic, organizational, and cultural changes mandated by the rise of electronic 
business” (Caldwell).  IBM began retooling the mainframe system to reflect the market’s 
new needs.  Beginning with the System/390, the platform was upgraded to 
“accommodate the new and emerging client workloads” (Boyer 51).  While maintaining 
backward compatibility, the new system structure provided support for the new Internet 
protocols.  The machines leveraged the Internet to handle the client/server type of 
transactions.   
IBM also equipped the mainframe with Linux.  The new operating system (OS) 
bridged the software compatibility gap introduced in the mid 90s.  Linux was an  open 
source project developed by various members of the open source community.   As a fully 
functional operating system, it came with components needed for system management, 
security and performance.  Integrating it with the mainframe was a low cost option for 
IBM.  The open source product provided free distribution and very flexible licensing 
restrictions.  Users could enhance their system as needed for their businesses without 
incurring royalty fees.  Unlike the previous OS,  it was also enabled with Java 
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capabilities.  The traditionally complex z/OS layer was simplified  for people who were 
familiar with more standard operating systems such as Windows or Unix (Eilert et al 3-4, 
32).   
The zSeries 900 mainframe family was released in 2000 as the first system built 
for eBusiness.  The new line “allowed thousands of servers to operate within one physical 
box” (Milberg).  This feature gave the IBM mainframes a superior competitive advantage 
over the distributed network solutions.  Customers could consolidate their servers into 
one machine.  This new line also fully embraced the “new software standards of the open 
movement, Web serving, enterprise applications, and Linux workloads” (Boyer 51).  The 
zSeries 900 line, was followed by the System z9 release in 2005 and System z10 in 2008.  
Using the latest z10 Enterprise Class mainframe solution, customers were able to replace 
approximately 1500 Intel x86 servers with 85 percent more energy efficiency (Milberg).  
Through these transformations the mainframe made a comeback.  Equipped with 
server capabilities, these machines continue to prove that they are a viable competitor 
against the distributed network solutions.  Adapted for e-business, the mainframe’s 
reliability and data integrity also makes them popular for businesses that want to support 
online transactions.  Although personal computers and the distributed networks still play 
a role in various e-businesses transactions, mainframes can behave as powerful servers 
performing a majority of the critical operations (Boyer 52-53).  In 2004, Steve Hamm 
comments that, “even today, a decade after the pundits declared the mainframe dead, 
more than 70% of the world’s digital information resides on the machines” (Hamm 
2004).  In the same year, the research firm Gartner reported that, “IBM now dominates 
the mainframe market, with about 80 percent market share and growing” (LaMonica).  
Although the mainframe dominates, IBM strategy needs to stay focused on the ever-
changing market. 
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Chapter 8:  Recommendations for the Future 
IBM needs to continue to educate the server market about the mainframe solution.  
Dennis Wunder is an IBMer who interacts with hundreds of customers at the 
Poughkeepsie briefing center in New York.  In a 2008 interview, he surmised that based 
on his experience in the IT industry, customers continue to apply yesterday’s answers to 
today’s problems.  He pointed out that ninety-nine percent of customers who are looking 
to reduce costs and simplify their IT infrastructure have followed the old client/server 
deployment model.  Customers have continued to accrue servers in order to sustain their 
company’s application needs.  Over time these solutions have resulted in a “server 
sprawl” where, as Wunder points out, some companies have grown their 9,000 servers to 
11,000 in a 15-month period.  This drastic increase in hardware has a significant cost 
impact to a company.  In order to reduce these costs, customers are looking for better 
solutions.  Accordingly, IBM needs to be proactive in informing customers on the 
benefits of the mainframe (Carico). 
The IBM Academic Initiative program is an example of how IBM educates the 
future workforce on mainframe concepts and technologies.  In partnerships with different 
educational institutions, the company provides educators with the latest System z training 
tools. Students learn the skills and knowledge required to support the mainframe 
architecture (“IBM Academic Initiative System z program”).  Dennis Wunder points out 
that in the IT industry, people follow their skills and prefer to work on familiar platforms.  
During the mid 90s, many people became accustomed to the client/server deployment 
method.  This mainstream solution allowed many businesses to take this approach to 
address their various IT needs (Carico).  In order for the mainframe solution to become a 
familiar platform and a mainstream solution, IBM needed to start educating the future 
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workforce early.  By assisting colleges and universities in creating a curriculum for 
mainframe education, IBM is able to ensure the availability of mainframe experts in the 
future.  
The company needs to continue to support this program and extend it to more 
universities if possible.  This initiative is an excellent way to ensure the mainframe’s 
viability in the market.  Participating in the program, students get the training and 
education needed to support system z.   They are equipped with a knowledge and skill set 
needed to improve and support the IT infrastructure of their future employers.  The 
program also provides IBM’s mainframe customers with qualified students for jobs and 
internships.  It educates the next generation about the mainframe’s benefits (“IBM 
Academic Initiative System z program”).  
IBM should also continue to innovate and consider new and non-traditional uses 
for the mainframe.  In order to expand its market, different uses for the system should be 
explored.  In mid-2000, for example, the mainframe system was used to host an online 
multiplayer game developed by Hoplon Infotainment.  System z proved to be the best 
solution for this small Brazilian startup company who had limited funds (Hamm 2006).  
Traditionally, the mainframe market consists of a small number of large customers such 
as major banks or government agencies.  In order to expand, however, IBM needs to 
prove the mainframe’s versatility and flexibly to support different types of customers and 
needs.  IBM needs to be sensitive to market trends in technology and explore future 
potentials. 
The mainframe’s strategy needs to fit IBM’s overall goal of providing the best 
solutions for customers.  The Smarter Planet initiative encourages clients to work with 
IBM to efficiently use technology to reduce costs, improve service and manage risk.  
Although the system z mainframe is the right solution for some business, it may not be 
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for others (“IBM: A Smarter Planet”).  The IBM Server group encompasses a wide range 
of servers and each one needs to be equally represented to customers.  For example, if a 
business is managing over 11,000 servers, it is likely to incur large costs associated with 
software licensing, power, cooling and human resources.  If the customer is looking to 
reduce these costs, the mainframe is the smarter solution because the servers can be 
consolidated into a few mainframe systems.  With a minimized number of resources, the 
customer can quickly reduce their operating costs (Carico).  On the other hand, if one is 
looking to improve performance, a superior system or a hybrid solution might be optimal.  
The Smarter Planet initiative promotes problem solving to meet the customer’s needs 
with the best suited IBM products (“IBM: A Smarter Planet”). 
IBM’s representatives for the different server brands need to be well equipped to 
recommend solutions that best fit a customer’s needs.  Edward Gauthier, a senior 
consultant at the briefing center in Poughkeepsie, New York, remarks that historically 
some viewed the IBM server group as “a loose confederation of warring tribes;”  
promoting only products for which they are responsible (Gauthier).  In order to be more 
effective, learning needs to occur across the different server lines.  In doing so, 
consultants will be more knowledgeable of the benefits the other server lines provide and 
will recommend solutions that are best suited for each customer’s unique needs.   
Although the Smarter Planet campaign encourages customers to work with IBM, the 
message is very broad and ambiguous.  It is up to IBM team to educate potential 
customers with solutions that best meet their needs. 
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Chapter 9:  Conclusion 
The IBM mainframe has survived for over 45 years.  IBM’s strategy has 
reinvented and adapted the machine to accommodate new market trends and new 
customer needs.  Even though analysts estimate that the sales “represent less than 4% of 
IBM’s revenue in a good year, the combination of mainframe hardware, storage, 
software, and services account for nearly half of its profits” (Hamm 2009).  If the 
company wants the mainframe to survive another 45 years, it needs to continue to be in 
tune with market trends and customer needs.  IBM needs to make the market aware of the 
mainframe’s presence and benefits.  Opportunities for market expansion should be 
explored and IBM’s company wide initiatives should be utilized to promote the 
mainframe’s benefits.
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